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The Torture Debate: What the scholars and the intellectuals are saying 
"The United States does not torture. It's against our laws, and it's against our values. I 
have not authorized it-and I will not authorize it" (Danner 2009, p.6). That sentence is extracted 
from the speech that the fonner President of the United States, George W. Bush, gave on 
September 6th 2006 while addressing the nation from the East Room of the White House. That 
sentence perfectly fits the image of the United States that has always been put forward in public 
when it comes to defining our leading position in defense of human rights. However, we now 
know that the Bush Administration adopted a set of practices that qualify as torture in the 
interrogation of several prisoners. The Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate 
(CASUSS)(2009) reported that after 9111, several detainees in U.S custody were interrogated 
using methods that fit the definition of torture jn the Third Geneva Convention and in the United 
Nation Convention Against Torture. More importantly, the report tracks the evolution of those 
interrogation practices and concludes that they were"approved by high officials such as Secretary 
Rumsfeld who-when he was asked to approve interrogation techniques such as stress positions, 
use of dogs, depravation of light, and more-famously said "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is 
standing [of detainees] limited to 4 hours?" (CASUSS 2009, p.xix). 
Though they had been happening for some time, such interrogation practices were kept 
,secret from the public until February 2004, when the photographs from Abu Ghraib surfaced in 
the media. Out of the alleged sixteen thousand photographs that were taken, only two became 
iconic due to their constant presence in the media: "one of an Iraqi prisoner standing on a box 
with electric wires attached to his genitals, toes, and fingers, and one of prison guard Lynndie 
England holding a wounded Iraqi prisoner on a tie-down strap" (McClintock 2009.p59). After 
such atrocious images were made public, several people denounced the use of torture by 
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American authorities, but the authorities blamed those pictures on a few bad apples. However, 
we know from the CASUSS (2009) report that "the abused detainees of Abu Ghraib in the late 
2003 were not simply the result of a few soldiers acting on their own" (p.xxix). From the 
circulation of those pictures, the question oftorture emerged in political debates. Those debates 
were more conspicuous in the later years oftheBush Administration, but even after President 
Obama took office, the debates continued, and even increased, as exemplified in Crawford's 
(2010) article "Torture and the Ideology of National Security." In his article, Crawford critiques 
President Obama for wanting to move forward without holding accountable the officials who 
authorized torture during the Bush Administration. Along with Crawford, several intellectuals 
and scholars have continued the debate over torture outside of popular media. Some have argued 
that it has become necessary to use torture; others have argued that torture should never be 
sanctioned by liberal democracies; and other groups have developed arguments that fall 
somewhere between those two extreme positions. 
In this paper, I will explore several arguments that directly or indirectly sanction torture 
in certain instances. I will specifically focus on three authors, namely Alan Dershowitz, Michael 
Walzer, and Richard Posner. Dershowitz is an American lawyer who is also a professor at 
Harvard Law School. He is well known in the torture debate because he has argued that torture is 
inclusive in our political lives, so we should either institutionalize and regulate it through 
''torture warrants," or we should let it happen in secret with no accountability and suffer the 
consequences. Michael Walzer is a prominent American philosopher who is also a professor at 
the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey. He has published in a vast array of 
topics, and he is perhaps most famously known for his "problem of dirty hands." Walzer argues 
that political leaders must often do the legally wrong thing in order to achieve the morally right 
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thing. In the case of torture, a political leader would "dirty his hands" by allowing torture in 
order to do the morally right thing, prevent a nuclear attack, for example. Richard Posner is an 
American legal theorist who is currently a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Chicago. He is known in the torture debate because he argues that in times of 
emergency, the executive should bend the constitution and allow the torture of a terrorist who 
could reveal lifesaving information. After exploring the proposals of those three authors in 
details, I will develop other arguments that directly or indirectly respond to their positions. Then, 
I will conclude each section by giving my own assessment of the proposals of each of the three 
authors. I will conclude by explaining why this debate is important for an American and a global 
audience, and I will argue that in order to further the torture debate and decide whether we, as 
individuals, believe torture should be permissible or not, we need to establish a connection 
between the atrocities of torture and the atrocities of more acceptable practices such as war. 
It is important to notice, though, that while this paper is based on torture in post 9/11 
America, torture was certainly a United States government practice long before 2001. Also, the 
practice oftorture is not exclusive to the United States, and it was recorded in other countries. 
This is evidenced by McCoy (2006) as he explores instances of torture as early as during the 
Cold War in Asia, Latin America, and Central America (61). Specifically, "Amnesty 
International documented widespread torture . .. in twenty-four...nations" which include South 
. Vietnam, Brazil, Uruguay, Iran, and the Philippines (McCoy, 2006, p.60-61). In addition to those 
countries, several instances of torture were recorded in different European countries inthe 
1940's. Those countries include France and Belgium in 1941, Czechoslovakia in 1942, Denmark 
. in 1943, Germany in 1944, and Austria in 1945 (Relaji 2007, p.496-497). Also, Israel is one of 
the most conspicuous countries in the debate of torture because though it is not the only one in 
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which torture has been practiced, Israel is the only country that has ever used torture within the 
law (Dershowitz, 2002). 
Dershowitz and the Torture Warrants 
One of the most prominent authors who argue for the occasional sanction of torture is 
Alan Dershowitz (2002) In the chapter four of his book Why Terrorism Works, Dershowitz 
explores the question of whether or not we should torture a terrorist in a ticking bomb scenario, 
which is a scenario in which a bomb, preferably a nuclear bomb, is planted somewhere and will 
go off in a short time and kill hundreds of innocents; the authorities capture a terrorist who 
knows where the bomb is located, but he refuses to talk-----<io they torture him? He starts by 
arguing that liberal democracies are, for the most part, very attached to the prohibition of torture. 
He illustrates this with the case of a former prime minister of Italy who was kidnapped by 
terrorists in 1978. An officer suggested to the leader of the investigation that they could torture a 
detainee who possibly had information on where to find the former prime minister; the leader of 
the investigation declined and claimed that losing the life of the former prime minister would not 
be as tragic as introducing torture in Italy-ultimately, the prime minister was killed, and that 
shows the price Italian authorities were willing to pay to keep torture out of their nation. 
Dershowitz (2002) continues the development of his argument by addressing those who 
believe that torture should not be used because it does not work and only produces useless 
misinformation. Dershowitz responds by saying that though many people wish torture did not 
work, the tragic reality is that it does work. As an illustration, he uses a case in 1995 where the 
Philippino authorities tortured a terrorist until he gave up information that was used to prevent an 
attempt to assassinate the Pope and the crash of several commercial planes carrying thousands of 
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passengers into the Pacific Ocean. From that case, Dershowitz concludes that pretending that 
torture never works is not advancing the debate on whether to torture a ticking bomb terrorist or 
not. He also makes the point that torture doesn't always work, the same way all other techniques 
of crime prevention don't always work. The fact that torture sometimes works in producing 
valuable intelligence is the very reason why, despite all the anti-torture movements, torture has 
not completely been eradicated from any nation. In the current age of biological, chemical, and 
nuclear terrorism, we have to bring up torture as an alternative, he argues, because we are 
doomed to face tragic choices that would require the use of torture. 
In his essay, "Want to torture? Get a warrant," Dershowitz (2002) furthers his arguments 
by explaining that if American authorities had captured a terrorist with information regarding an 
imminent attack on Americans, and the terrorist refused to give up this vital information, there is 
no doubt in his mind that the authorities would torture the terrorist. In fact, Dershowitz argues 
that the majority of Americans would expect the authorities to torture a terrorist in such a case 
regardless of our anti-torture laws. Also, most Americans would expect their government to 
break any anti-torture law or treaty possible in order to save American lives. Therefore, 
Dershowitz does not believe the debate should be about whether to use torture or not since he 
believes it would certainly be used in the case described above. Instead, the debate should be on 
whether torture should be used within the law or outside the law. 
Dershowitz (2002) is certain that American authorities would use torture in a case as 
extreme as the one described above because ail democracies, including the United States, have 
used torture outside the law at some point. He explains that only Israel has used torture within 
the law because of the specific challenges they face with terrorism. Israel arguably faces terrorist 
attacks involving bombs on a more regular basis than any other country in the world, and 
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Dershowitz argues that while the ticking bomb scenario has been a hypothesis in most cases in 
which it is discussed, Israel is the one country where the ticking bomb scenario is real. 
In order to put the Israeli situation in perspective, it is worth mentioning that terror 
attacks involving bombs are daily occurrences in Israel. This explains why Israeli authorities 
have at times believed that sanctioning harsh interrogation methods (torture) was the right thing 
to do in their situation. A famous example in which Israeli authorities have publicly defended 
their use of harsh interrogation techniques is that ofNachshon Waxman, a 19 year old army 
corporal who was kidnapped by Palestinian terrorists on October 9th 1994. The Israelis captured 
the driver of the car in which Waxman had been taken away, and they severely tortured him until 
he told them where Waxman was being held. Waxman was killed during the attempt of his 
rescue, but the prime minister of the time,Yitzhak Rabin, stood by his decision to allow the 
torture of the car driver, and he argued that torture was the reason they were able to locate 
Waxman and at least have a chance to attempt his rescue. Authors such as Krauthammer (2004) 
have argued that the prime minister's position, especially given that he was a Nobel Prize 
laureate, proves that torture should be an option is certain situations. Even individuals who are 
known for their pacifism recognize that the Israeli situation is special, and that's why the use of 
torture is a very important topic in Israel 
Dershowiz (2002) continues by arguing that Israel has used harsh techniques on 
prisoners, including locking them in smelly rooms, putting a sack on their heads, and shaking 
them until they gave the information the interrogators needed. In cases where such interrogation 
techniques provided fruitful answers, the Israeli government never allowed the information 
obtained to be used in a court room, but they used it to prevent several terrorist acts. According 
to Dershowitz, several terrorist attacks were prevented in Israel because of information obtained 
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through torture. Dershowitz does not refer to specific evidence for this Claim, but cases such as 
Waxman's come to mind as despite the fact that he was killed, it is thanks to torture that Israeli 
authorities were able to locate him. 
However, despite the fact that those rough interrogation techniques allegedly prevented 
several terrorist attacks, they brought so much controversy that the president ofthe Israeli 
Supreme Court banned the use of those rough interrogation tactics on suspected terrorists. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court left a provision that would allow interrogators to use those 
tactics on a terrorist in a case of a ticking bomb scenario, a case in which the suspected terrorist 
refused to give up information that could save hundreds of innocent lives. In such a case, the 
. interrogator would be protected from crimina] charges by the "Law ofNecessity," which implies 
that the interrogator did what was necessary in that specific situation. 
Although such a ticking bomb scenario has never happened in the United States, 
Dershowitz believes that it will happen in America sooner or later. Therefore, in order to prepare 
for such a scenario, we should design special torture warrants that could only be issued by a 
judge and would allow some specific agents to use torture to save innocent lives. 
In his book Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age, Dershowitz (2002) explains 
how such torture warrants would operate. They would only be issued in a case where innocent 
lives were at stake and if there was probable evidence that the suspected terrorist had information 
'COuld save those innocent lives, but he refused to give up the information. Also, Dershowitz 
that the tortured victim be given immunity if the information he provided helps to foil an 
Specifically, the torture victim could receive immunity from prosecution and receive .a 
IlJlllllUwn of cash and a new identity as reward. He also emphasizes that the means used to 
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torture the suspect be nonlethal. He gives the example of tactics such as inserting sterile needles 
under the nails of the suspect to provoke agonizing pain without endangering his life. 
Dershowitz (2002) admits that it might sound awful that a judge could issue a warrant to 
allow a practice as horrible as torture, but he reminds his readers that the other alternative would 
be to have several police officers illegally use torture and escape all accountability. Also, he 
recognizes that some people f!1ight be concerned that a torture warrant designed for ticking bomb 
scenarios would undoubtedly engage on a slippery slope that would lead to such warrants being 
issued for cases without ticking bombs. However, Dershowitz believes that is unlikely; in fact, 
he believes the opposite is more likely because with the existence of torture warrants, it would be . 
harder to justify torture without warrants. Therefore, torture warrants would actually decrease the 
frequency at which torture is used. Dershowitz believes such warrants would not be vulnerable to 
a slippery slope because there would be accountability. Nobody would be allowed to torture 
without warrant, and anybody who would torture without warrant would be held accountable. 
Dershowitz believes fewer people would engage in unlawful torture, and the lawful tortures 
would also be significantly fewer because of all the conditions that would have to be met for the 
issuance ofa torture warrant. 
In response to Dershowitz' Torture Warrants 
Not surprisingly, Dershowitz's (2002) proposal of torture warrants has outraged many 
~~"i\i~I.II",;)and scholars, and as a result, several of them have criticized his proposal. For 
Gross (2004) argues that instead of the circumstantial sanction of torture proposed by 
ftmIN1t'7_ we should legally have a total ban of torture in all circumstances from a pragmatist 
perspective. However, Gross admits that there might be extreme situations that require 
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our elected officials to go beyond the law, and one of such extreme situation could require that 
the law that prohibits torture be violated. Thus, he argues that we should have a law that forbids 
torture in all circumstances, but he believes that law can be violated in certain situations. In order 
to deal with those extreme situations, Gross argues that Dershowitz's proposal of torture 
warrants is not a good idea because it essentially uses an extreme and unusual situation as the 
basis for a general policy. Gross believes instead that truly extreme situations may give rise to 
official disobedience. He argues that officials might act extra legally in such extreme situations, 
but they should be ready to accept the legal ramifications of their actions. So, while Dershowitz 
argues that torture can be morally and legally permissible, Gross argues that even if there are 
situations in which torture can be morally permissible, it does not mean that we should tum those 
exceptions into laws. When an official acts outside the law in an extreme situation, Gross argues, 
it is up to the public as a whole to implement Ex Post ratifications. Thus, the role played by the 
public afterthe facts is essential in Gross' proposal. 
Gross (2004) elaborates his proposal of Ex Post ratifications by arguing that 
acknowledging that extra legal actions might sometimes be necessary is not a way of saying 
officials should break the laws whenever they want. In fact, Gross specifically emphasizes that 
our officials should feel uneasy about acting outside the -law; he believes when they feel uneasy 
about breaking the law, officials will only break it when it is indeed necessary. That is one of the 
reasons he does not support Dershowitz's torture warrants. If those warrants were a lawful 
option, the officials would not necessary feel uneasy about issuing them, and that makes it more 
likely that they could be issued for the wrong reasons. He also argues that the fact that torture has 
been banned by many liberal democracies, including the United States, will make it even harder 
for any official to allow it, and because of such reticence to allow torture, no official would allow 
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it if it was not absolutely necessary. Gross concludes his argument with three reasons why his 
proposal is a better one than Dershowitz's: first, the need for officials to give reasons why they 
want to break the law will be a restraining factor in itself; second, the open acknowledgment of 
the officials that they are breaking the law by allowing torture will allow an opened dialogue 
between the government, its domestic constituency, and the global community; and thirdly, the 
fact that the officials who allowed torture would have to explain themselves before the public 
and accept the consequences will make it even more difficult for those officials to allow torture 
in less than extreme situations. That's how Gross believes torture should be handled-not with 
torture warrants. 
Another author who disagrees with Dershowitz's (2002) proposal is Scarry (2004). She 
starts her critique of Dershowitz by arguing that the fact that his argument is based on the 
imaginary ticking bomb scenario instead of the numerous real scenarios in which torture could 
be and/or has been used is highly problematic; therefore, we should not change our laws based 
on an imaginary scenario. She continues her critique by arguing that there are five significant 
problems with Dershowitz's proposal of torture warrants. The first problem of Dershowitz's 
proposal is that he assumes that indeed, anybody in a ticking bomb scenario would opt for 
torturing the suspect. That is the whole premise of Dershowitz's writings in support of his torture 
warrants. He assumes that we would all think like him, but Scarry argues that it would very 
much be possible that someone had enough conviction in their moral principles that they would 
not want to compromise them. Just as Dershowitz argues that most people would not want to 
compromise the lives of the potential victims, it is possible that many people would not want to 
compromise their anti-torture beliefs. 
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The second problem Scarry (2004) finds in Dershowitz's (2002) proposal is that it does 
not mention the confidence of the potential torturer who presumably finds himself in the ticking 
bomb scenario. Scarry believes it is very important that the torturer be confident about the 
outcome of his acts. So, he should ask himself how sure he is that when he tortures the victim, 
innocent lives will indeed be saved. Scarry suggests the potential torturer asks the following 
question: am I confident enough that he holds this lifesaving knowledge to the point that I would 
give up my liberty and even my life to torture him? Scarry believes that if the potential torturer 
then finds himself thinking, " I am not quite sure enough that I can give my liberty [or my life] to 
it"(3), then it is a clear signal that he is not confident enough that the victim actually holds the 
potentially lifesaving information. As a result, he should not torture. Scarry argues that this test 
would certainly be better and faster than trying to obtain a torture warrant from a judge. 
Scarry's (2004) third problem with Dershowitz's proposal is the ticking bomb scenario's 
improbability. She admits that it is indeed possible that terrorists could get hold of weapons of 
mass destruction and threaten innocent lives. However, she still believes a ticking bomb scenario 
would be improbable because that scenario implies that we have absolute certitude that the 
person we want to torture knows where the bomb is located. From real life, though, we know 
how imperfect knowledge can be, and we know that absolute certitude is almost impossible. If 
we have a way to absolutely know that the terrorist holds the information, we should also have a 
way to absolutely know where the bomb is located. Both instances are very unlikely, so relying 
on such premises makes the ticking bomb scenario highly improbable. 
Dershowitz's (2002) proposal's fourth problem, Scarry (2004) argues, is the idea that a 
torture warrant would decrease the instances in which torture is used because the judge who 
issues the warrants would only issue them in appropriate circumstances. Scarry explains that it 
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would be hard to choose which case would qualify as a ticking bomb scenario and which one 
would not. It is very likely that more warrants than Dershowitz thinks would be issued. To 
support her argument, Scarry elaborates that "the court set up to issue warrants under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has declined only one requested warrant in twenty-five 
years: the estimated number of warrants requested is twenty-five thousand" (5). This shows that 
it is very possible that torture warrants would not decrease the instances in which torture is used. 
The presence of a warrant would simply provide people with a guide on how to torture within the 
law. 
Scarry's (2004) fifth and final critique of Dershowitz's (2002) proposal is in his argument 
that torture warrants would provide more accountability because instances of torture would be 
documented and then reviewed later on to see if indeed all the conditions for a ticking bomb 
scenario were met. Scarry argues that this logic does not hold because if the person who tortured 
was issued a warrant before they did it, it means that they acted within the law. Therefore, trying 
to hold them accountable after the facts would imply that they can still be punished for using 
torture. But since they would have tortured in respect of the law, it would not make sense to 
prosecute them after the facts. If we prosecuted them, it would mean that we are prosecuting 
them for respecting the law. That is why Scarry thinks that torture warrants would not permit 
accountability. In fact, she believes the current system works better in holding people who use 
torture accountable because since all torture is illegal, anybody who is found out to have allowed 
torture or to have tortured can be brought to justice because they broke the law. Thus, 
maintaining an absolute prohibition of torture is better than having torture warrants. 
Along with Gross (2004) and Scarry (2004), a third author who critiques Dershowitz's 
(2002)proposal of torture warrants is Wisnewski (2008). Wisnewski's critique focuses on the 
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fact that Dershowitz sets up a premise that only allow us two choices: either allow torture with 
torture warrants so that the actors can be held accountable and instances of torture can be 
reduced, or accept the status quo, which Dershowitz describes as a situation where torture 
happens with no consideration of the law and without any form of accountability. In 
Dershowitz's view, torture is an inclusive part of our political life, and he does not believe we 
can ever get rid of it. That's why he only gives those two options when he makes his argument 
for torture warrants. However, Wisnewski believes those are not the only two options. 
Wisnewski (2008) argues that Dershowitz's (2002) proposal is heavily influenced by his, 
Dershowitz's, hatred of hypocrisy. Dershowitz believes it is highly hypocritical to have anti­
torture laws while torture is obviously happening in our country. Therefore, Dershowitz's torture 
warrants represent a way to reconcile our laws and our actions. But Wisnewski argues that 
hypocrisy, though a horrible trait, should not be a reason for allowing something that is even 
worse than hypocrisy-torture in this case. To support his point, Wisnewski gives the example of 
a secret killer who advocates for the suppression of killing in public. Maybe this killer is even a 
member of a human right organization that fights against killing, but at night, he is a secret killer. 
Though he is being hypocrite, it is certainly better than trying to institutionalize killing. The 
same goes with smoking: It is okay for someone who smokes in secret to discourage other people 
to smoke. His undeniable hypocrisy should not force him to endorse smoking. So Wisnewski 
agrees with Dershowitz that it is anti-democratic to have anti-torture laws while we have 
instances of torture in our country, but Wisnewski does not think that that would justify issuing 
. torture warrants, since torture warrants themselves would be anti..,democratic, and even arguably 
more anti-democratic than the hypocrisy of having anti-torture laws while being aware that 
torture is indeed practiced in the country. 
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Wisnewski (2008) concludes by coming back to his opening point that Dershowitz (2002) 
only brings two options to the table: whether to use torture legally or to use it illegally. However, 
one option that Dershowitz does not mention is the one written in the United Nation's anti-
torture convention that states that torture should never be permissible under any circumstance, 
and we should do everything in our power to make sure this position is enforced. The fact that 
Dershowitz ignores this third position makes his argument appear as one that is not trying to 
advance the debate about torture but one that is trying to end it. Unfortunately, by only giving 
two options and ignoring an important one, Dershowitz' proposal cannot be the right solution. 
My own assessment of Dershowitz's (2002) proposal for torture warrants is multi­
oriented, but I am only focusing on one aspect here-torture is impossible to control and in 
addition to the harm done to the torture victim, the torturer suffers significant damages that 
arguably lead him to lose his very humanity. Even if torture warrants are designed to be 
""'""v",",,,, I believe that once an individual starts torturing because he was ordered to do it in a 
I,IUI)DOSedly ticking bomb scenario, it is very likely that he will normalize the practice of torture 
and he will eventually be perverted by that practice. Thus, the torturer who started by simply 
respecting orders from a judge will possibly end up torturing for other reasons such as regular 
interrogation, punishment, entertainment, and even possibly out of pure enjoyment. The photos 
of Abu-Ghraib are the best evidence to this. The look in the eyes of those guards makes me think 
ofa human being who has lost his soul, the very essence of his humanity. If torture is 
institutionalized, in addition to all the problems pointed by the authors above, we are likely to 
have more perpetrators lose their very essence as humans. Thus, there will be a lot more 
instances of torture because these perpetrators will become immune to the atrocities of the 
practice. So, I don't think torture warrants would be the appropriate solution to our current 
14 
Dido Balla Global Honors Senior Thesis 
problem with torture. However, I agree with Dershowitz that the status quo is unacceptable. It is 
inadmissible that we ban torture on paper even though we practice it in actuality. Therefore, 
Dershowitz accomplishes a lot by exposing the failures of the current laws againsttorture, and I 
commend him for proposing possible laws as replacements. 
Walzer and The problem of dirty hands 
Walzer (1973) also argues that in certain situations, torture should be sanctioned. 
Specifically, he argues that a political leader might know torture to be wrong, but at the same 
time, he might believe its sanction is the right thing to do in a specific situation. In such a case, 
Walzer argues, the political . leader is facing a problem ofdirty hands and must sanction the 
torture. In Political action: The problem ofdirty hands, Walzer argues that it is impossible to 
govern innocently; it is easy to get one's hands dirty in politics, and it is often right to do so. He 
argues that it is permissible for a good man to do bad things when he faces certain situations as 
long as he realizes that he is doing something wrong, and he is ready to deal with whatever 
consequences ensue. In a case of torture, for example, this would mean that an official who 
allowed torture, knowing that torture is illegal, can be justified because of the specific 
circumstances (ticking bomb), but he should be ready to pay for it. He should turn himself in to 
justice and accept his sentence. Walzer then asserts that we should not judge such a man for he is 
a good man, but that does not make his actions right. That's why he should be ready to assume 
the punishment. 
In response to Walzer's problem of dirty hands 
Miesels (2008) is an author who partially agrees with Walzer's (1973) problem of dirty 
hands. In his article, "Torture and the problem of dirty hand," Meisels argues that it is generally 
agreed that liberal democracies believe torture is morally wrong. He explains that because of that 
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general belief, it had been clear for a long time that no liberal democracy would allow the use of 
torture in any circumstance. However, with the rise of international terrorism, it seems torture 
has become an option in liberal democracies when it is believed that torture of a captured 
terrorist could divulge lifesaving information. With that premise, Meisels elaborates on instances 
in which torture might be acceptable even though it is wrong. 
He starts by presenting Walzer's (1973) "dilemma of dirty hands" in which a leader 
knows that torture is wrong in all circumstances, but when he faces a situation when he believes 
torture would be the right thing to do, he allows it. Meisels (2008) supports this point by saying 
that torture might be morally unjustifiable, but in certain circumstances, it might be the required 
course of political action. In a sense, the leader who knows torture to be morally wrong but still 
authorizes it because it is the best thing to do is dirtying his hands with the blood of the tortured 
prisoner. His hands are dirty because torture is wrong and he knows it, but at the same time, he 
should not be blamed because he recognized that a wrong action had to be allowed for a good 
reason. So this leader is paradoxically doing a wrong that is right. 
In the case of a dirty hands problem, Walzer (1973) believes that the leader who allowed 
torture in the circumstances discussed above should be held accountable for his acts and accept 
any punishment that the law provides for his offense. The fact that his permission of torture 
might have produced successful consequences or the fact that he recognized that he did 
something wrong are not sufficient. Some sort of punishment should still be applied to him by 
the state, the public, or any qualified authority. Thus, Walzer believes that the leader should be 
punished for doing what he ought to have done. 
16 
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However, while Meisels (2008) supports the theory of the dirty hands, he disagrees with 
the idea that the leader who did what he ought to have done should be punished. For Meisels, the 
fact that the leader acted in good faith and did what he should have done for his people means he 
should not be punished. In fact, Meisels argues that punishing such a leader would be counter­
intuitive. If the leader had done something that we would not have expected him to do, then it 
would be okay to punish him, but if we recognize that hetook a risk, knowing that torture is 
wrong, but he still allowed it because he believed in good faith that was the best solution and the 
solution his people would favor, then punishing him is simply wrong. Thus, Meisels only 
partially agrees with Walzer's (1973) dirty hands theory-he argues that the leader who dirtied 
his hands should not be held accountable. 
Similarly to Miesels (2008), Nielsen (2000) partially agrees with Walzer's (1973) 
problem of dirty hands. In his article "There is no dilemma of dirty hands," Nielsen argues that 
Walzer is only right in parts of his argument about the problem of the dirty hands. Nielsen agrees 
with Walzer that in order to succeed in politics, even when we have the best intentions possible, 
we might have to commit acts that would be considered evil and/or unlawful; that is, in politics, 
.we are very likely to dirty our hands in order to prevent an even worse evil from happening. 
Though Nielsen agrees with Walzer thus far, he does not agree with Walzer's idea that the 
political leader dirties his hands because he does what is wrong in order to achieve what is right. 
Nielsen believes it is a contradiction or at least a paradox to claim that one must do wrong to do 
right. He argues that when we do what leads to the avoidance of the greater evil, we can't be 
doing what's wrong. In fact, by doing the lesser evil, we are doing what we ought to do, so we 
are doing what is right. Even though what the political leader does might be perceived as wrong 
in normal circumstances, the fact that he does it in order to prevent a greater evil makes it right. 
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Thus Nielsen believes that Walzer is wrong in his formulation of the problem of the dirty hands. 
In fact, Nielsen believes that there is no dilemma of dirty hands. 
To tie this back to the issue of torture, Nielsen (2000) understands and agrees that a 
political leader might find himself in a position where he must allow the torture of a terrorist in 
order to prevent an atomic bomb from detonating in a major city and killing thousands of 
innocents. However, unlike Walzer (1973), Nielsen does not think that the political leader who 
sanctions the torture of the terrorist is doing anything wrong. He does not even think there should 
be a moral dilemma in this situation, considering the greater evil that would have been 
prevented. Nielsen concludes by arguing that for a leader who dirtied his hands, by sanctioning 
torture for example, "it is difficult enough in such situations to ascertain what the lesser evil is 
and to steel ourselves to do it, without adding insult to injury by making, artificially and 
confusedly, a conceptual and moral dilemma out of it as well" (141). Nielsen believes that a 
political leader who has sanctioned torture went through very difficult times whi Ie making that 
decision, so he should certainly not be accused of being immoral for doing what's right. 
Another author who critiques Walzer's (1973) problem of dirty hands is Yeo (2000). In 
his essay "Dirty hands in politics: On the one hand, and on the other," Yeo argues that the 
politician who dirties his hands is more likely deceiving the public than actually facing a 
dilemma. To illustrate his point, Yeo analyzes Walzer's example of a political leader who 
I8Jlctions torture in a ticking bomb scenario because he believes it to be the right thing to do in 
order to save innocent lives. Walzer insists that this specific political leader believes it is wrong 
to torture not only in certain circumstances, but always. In fact, during his campaign, this 
political leader has angrily expressed his beliefin the absolute evil of torture. This political 
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leader expresses two contradictory views: one that says it is right to torture the ticking bomb 
terrorist and another that says it is never right to torture. 
Yeo (2000) argues that such contradiction needs to be reconciled. The mere fact that the 
political leader feels guilty, as Walzer (1973) argues, is not enough to reconcile the 
contradiction. So in an attempt to reconcile it, Yeo proposes that maybe this political leader 
changed his mind on the topic of torture. Maybe he used to think torture was absolutely non­
permissible, but he has now changed his mind and believes torture can sometimes be permissible 
or vice versa. However, Yeo argues that it is unlikely that such change happened in the views of 
the political leader. But it remains impossible that this leader actually believes both views as they 
are opposite. Instead, Yeo argues, it is more likely that for politicaJ reasons, he does not want us, 
the public, to know that he would ever sanction torture, especially because he knows torture to be 
legally and morally wrong. However, Yeo believes there is an even stronger proof that this 
political leader is probably lying, and he is probably very likely to lie in the future. If this leader 
knows it is wrong to torture, but he allows it because he believes it is better for the public, then 
he could certainly do the same thing about lying. He might strongly believe that lying is wrong in 
itself, but ifhe also believes that lying would be the better thing to do in order to preserve the 
moral order or to ensure the credibility of the press release, for example, he will certainly lie. 
More specifically, "since the dirty-hands deed cannot publicly be reconciled with official 
morality, it may be necessary that it be covered up, suppressed, or otherwise concealed" (162). 
Thus Yeo concludes that the dirty hand politician who allowed torture, far from facing a 
dilemma, is actually a liar who should not be trusted. 
My assessment of Walzer's (1973) problem of the dirty hand is virtually a combination of 
the positions advanced by the three authors above. I agree with Walzer's proposal that political 
19 
Dido Balla Global Honors Senior Thesis 
leaders find themselves in situations in which they must make decisions that would not be 
appropriate in regular times. I also agree that if they judge they should authorize unlawful 
actions, they should do it. However, the fact that a political leader who dirtied his hands feels 
guilty about his acts is irrelevant to me. What matters is that he broke the law, and in order to 
determine how to respond to his temporary suspension of the rule oflaw, the public and other 
government official should look at the results of his actions after the facts. If indeed it is 
unanimously, or atleast in majority, determined that he did what was best and the future supports 
his decision, then he should be forgiven. But ifhis acts are proven unnecessary and useless, he 
should be punished for it. In order to address Yeo's (2000) valid concern about the honesty of 
political leaders, it is important that how they feel be irrelevant, especially because we have no 
certain way of knowing how a person feels about an issue such as torture beyond what they 
communicate to us. Therefore I agree with Walzer that political leaders face a problem of dirty 
hands, but I don't think their moral position on the matter should be considered--only their 
actions and their results should be considered. 
Posner and the presidential powers during emergency times 
While Dershowitz (2002) focused his argument on the regulation of torture and Walzer 
(1973) focused his on the ethics of a leader who has dirtied his hands by allowing torture, Posner 
(2006) addresses issues related to torture by using the constitution and the presidential powers as 
basis. In his book, Not a Suicide Pact, Posner argues that the constitution is not supposed to be a 
document that never changes. He believes it should be bent to fit specific circumstances because 
a constitution that does not bend will eventually break, thus leading to losses that could have 
been prevented if the constitution had been bent. In fact, he argues that the constitution is meant 
to be loosened in order to let the democratic forces play in extreme circumstances. That's why in 
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times of danger, civil liberties are narrowed. Posner argues that according to the constitution, the 
president is responsible for the security of the nation, so in such times of danger, he is the one to 
decide how narrow the civil liberties should be. In a case of a terrorist threat or attack, for 
example, we should agree to have our liberties narrowed until the threat is averted, no matter 
how long it takes. 
While we are all supposed to have our civil liberties narrowed in times of danger such as 
terrorist threats, the terrorist suspects, according to Posner, should be given even less 
constitutional right than ordinary criminals. In fact, in an attempt to protect the nation during a 
terrorist threat, it can be justified to torture terrorist suspects if it is believed they can help 
prevent attacks against the nation. Posner refers to the "law of necessity" as a moral justification 
for acting against the constitution by allowing torture of terrorist suspects. He even goes further 
by arguing that the law of necessity can trump constitutional rights in extreme circumstances. All 
those decisions of what is necessary in times of emergency should be made by the government, 
and Posner argues that we should acknowledge that the government should have the power and 
even the duty to violate certain rights, including constitutional rights, when they judge it to be the 
right thing to do to prevent catastrophic harm to the nation. 
In the chapter four of his book, Not a Suicide Pact, Posner (2006) argues that the greater 
the information kept by a terrorist is believed to be, the greater coerced methods his interrogators 
should use to make him speak, and the greater such coerced interrogation is allowed by the 
constitution. Posner believes the degree of coercion used on a suspect who refuses to speak 
should be proportional to the value of the information the suspect holds. If for example the 
suspect refuses to give up information about the location of a ticking bomb, the location of 
weapons of mass destruction, the name of a key terrorist leader, etc., then the coercion should be 
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as great as possible to make him talk. Then in an argument reminiscent of Dershowitz's (2002), 
Posner even claims that in such a situation, most people would support the torture of that 
terrorist. 
He then continues by explaining that as long as the criminal defendant is not sentenced 
and the information gathered through coerced interrogation is not used to convict him of a crime, 
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fifth 
Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination are not applicable. Thus, a terrorist being 
tortured in an attempt to prevent imminent or future attacks against the nation is not protected by 
the constitution. 
Addressing possible critics, Posner (2006) recognizes that certain people, diehard 
libertarians, as he calls them, would probably not support torture even in extreme situations on 
the grounds that torture never works anyway. But he argues that such beliefs are incorrect 
because despite the fact that some people will withhold information even when they are tortured 
and some others will make up information to stop the torture, torture remains an effective 
method to gather true information. The numerous cases of false positives do not mean that 
torture never works. 
In order to address the concerns of those who would still oppose torture of a terrorist in 
extreme circumstances, Posner (2006) invites his readers to consider the fact that we still execute 
people, and when soldiers kill enemies on the battle field, no one, including themselves, seems to 
believe they are doing anything wrong. He then goes on to explain that the torture he advocates 
has nothing to do with the type of torture used by dictators in order to scare or intimidate people. 
In addition, given the wide opposition of torture in America and the numerous leaks about 
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instances of torture in America, it is clear, in Posner's perspective, that the American 
. government would never allow torture of a suspect unless it believed torture to be necessary for 
the specific circumstance. 
Posner (2006) believes we should trust the authorities to recognize and act on moral 
duties that might be higher than their legal duties. That's why he argues that President Lincoln 
.' 
was right when he acted on a moral duty higher than his legal duty by suspending habeas corpus 
for Confederate sympathizers during the civil war. Posner believes Lincoln was as right in his 
breaking of the law as Gandhi and Martin Luther Kingwere right in their breaking of the law. 
Martin Luther King and Gandhi broke the law and revolted to solve the specific problems they 
faced in their time. So today, with the existence of weapons of mass destruction that could 
possibly ki II thousands or even millions of innocent Americans, the president's moral and 
political duty should be to authorize torture if it can save those innocent lives-it would be 
necessary for the president to allow torture in such extreme circumstances. 
Posner (2006) concludes chapter four of his book by arguing that the president is the 
ultimate decision maker in cases of emergency. Whether or not the country is at war, the 
president, as the commander in chief, is always expected to defend the nation. That is a right that 
is given to him by the constitution, so he should be expected to act on it. 
In response to Posner and the presidential powers during emergency times 
Cole (2007) disagrees with Posner's argument, and he argues that Posner's (2006) 
interpretation of the constitution is very ill-suited because it goes against the very idea of 
precommitment that is the basis of constitutional ism. By arguing that a constitution that does not 
bend will eventually break, Posner t~eats the constitution as a document that invites utilitarian 
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judgments that would allow the law to be broken depending on the specific case. By doing so 
and arguing that all the power to decide what the constitution means should be left to a 
government judge, Posner, according do Cole, fails to recognize the constitution as based on 
precommitment, and instead, he gives all the power to define what the constitution means to 
judges who use their own subjective judgments to impose their will on others. 
Cole (2007) argues that precommitments are so important in the constitution because the 
constitution is designed to guide us in times when we would be tempted tp act irrationally. He 
argues that history tells us that in times of great fear and danger in liberal democracies, we tend 
to act just in such irrational manners with actions that target vulnerable groups and sacrifice them 
for the gains of the majority. Therefore, the constitution is there to remind us that we should 
avoid such behaviors. We should look at the con~titution as a document that gears us in the right 
direction regardless ofthe specific situation and especially in situations where we would be 
tempted to target the vulnerable-the torture victim in the context ofthis paper. 
To respond to Posner's position on coercive interrogation, Cole (2007) restates Posner's 
position that the Fifth Amendment would only protect a torture victim if the confession was used 
in court; therefore, if the victim was tortured solely for intelligence purpose, he is not protected 
by the Fifth Amendm~nt. But Cole observes that in his argument, Posner only focuses on one 
case that serves his purpose, Miranda vs. Arizona, and he ignores several other Supreme Court 
decisions that banned involuntary confession for the simple reason that the interrogation methods 
violated the due process of law. This shows that when an individual is coerced to confess against 
his will, especially through physically harmful acts, this individual can still be protected by the 
due process law even ifhis confession is not brought up in court against him. 
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Cole (2007) concludes that the constitution should not be left to some officials to 
determine whether or not they should bend it depending on how much information they expect to 
uncover through torturing someone. Due process highlights certain basic rights that are 
applicable to all human beings in all circumstances, and all human beings are protected against 
torture and all inhuman and degrading treatments. Not only the constitution protects potential 
torture suspects against such treatments, but the international convention against torture does the 
same, and virtually all nations in the world, including the United States, have ratified it, so 
torture should never be allowed on the grounds that the constitution does not prohibit it. 
In addition to Cole (2007) Kremnitzer and Levanon (2009) critique Posner's argument 
that in time of national security, the law should be changed to fit the specific situation. Posner 
(2006) believes constitutional standards should be shaped to handle the specific situation of 
emergency. In the context of this paper, that would be imminent nuclear attack from terrorists. 
Kremnitzer and Levanon stand against this proposition and argue that balancing principles such 
as the ones in the constitution are not designed for specific circumstances. Instead, they are 
designed to be flexible enough to cover a very wide variety of cases based on "overall 
assessment of the importance of liberty vis-A-vis safety or according to the level of harm to 
which each value can reasonably be subjected. They are shaped with the prospect of being 
applied under all circumstances and take changing circumstances into account" (250). Therefore, 
Kremnitzer and Levanonargue, Posner's implication that the constitution cannot sufficiently . 
direct us on how to handle emergencies, even ones as extreme as a nuclear attack from terrorist, 
is erroneous. Kremnitzer and Levanon continue by arguing that there is no reason to believe that 
the designers of the constitution did not think about how it would work in times of emergency. 
Even if the constitution was designed in times of peace, it should still be applicable in times of 
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emergency. This should especially be the case, Kremnitzer and Levanon argue, because in times 
of emergency, specifically when the country is in great danger, even the greatest judges can be 
influenced by fear, patriotism, public pressure, etc. to the point that they could exaggerate a 
situation of emergency. 
Kremnitzer and Levanon (2009) expand that if, as Posner (2006) suggests, the 
constitution is bent during emergencies, and civil liberties of certain individuals are taken away, 
it is important to realize that such liberties will be taken away for a very long time, if not forever. · 
This is the case because terrorist threats, Kremnitzer &nd Levanon argue, are not likely to 
disappear soon. 
Also, when Posner (2006) specifically argues that torture should be allowed as a 
preventive measure during emergencies, he argues that the power to allow torture should be 
given to the executive. He argues that it is the constitutional right of the executive to decide 
when to allow torture, and we must all accept it. HoweYer, Kremnitzer and Levanon (2009) 
argue that Posner does not provide a solution to the inherent lack of trust we have towards the 
government. In explaining some of the reasons why we are suspicious of the government, 
especially during emergencies, Kremnitzer and Levanon state that decision makers are usually 
more prone to act on what will solve a problem in the immediate, and they often ignore the moral 
aspects of problem; also, decision makers tend to see solutions to problems as black or white, so 
they are likely to consider only two options instead of several others; and finally, decision 
makers tend to focus on short term results instead of long term. In the case of torturing a terrorist, 
for example, decision makers could allow torture and be satisfied because the torture provided 
short term results, but they would not necessarily consider the long term effects that the sanction 
of torture could have in a society in which terrorism still exists. For those different reasons, 
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Kremnitzer and Levanon believe torture should never be allowed. In fact, they conclude that 
commitment to the rule of law is essential to liberal democracies, so we should not allow any 
practice that would move us away from our laws. This, the authors argue, is exactly what 
Posner's proposal of bending the constitution during emergencies would do. 
In his critique of Posner's (2006) proposal, Margulies (2006) focuses on Posner's "law of 
necessity." Margulies argues that it is problematic to give broad powers to the executive during 
emergencies with the justification that those powers are a necessity to avoid long term damages 
that may result from trying to force the president to respect the current laws. Margulies believes 
this is problematic because any regime that allows exceptions to the law will inevitably expand 
and attempt to use those exceptions even in situations when they are not necessary. To illustrate 
this, Margulies uses the very example of President Lincoln, which was also used by Posner in his 
writings. Margulies explains that after the civil war, President Lincoln tried to try non-belligerent 
before military commissions although the Federal Courts were again operational. The Supreme 
Court did not allow this to happen, but it can be argued that since President Lincoln had used the 
"law of necessity" once before and had made exception of his breaking of the rule, he was 
encouraged to try it again despite the fact that it was not at all necessary. In this case, the 
presence of the federal courts made it totally unnecessary to try civilians before military 
commissions, but President Lincoln still tried to do it. In addition, President Lincoln's 
suspension of Habeas Corpus during the civil war, Margulies argues, set the precedent for future 
instances of presidents making an exception of themselves in less justifiable circumstances. This 
was the case of "Wilson's suppression of civil liberties and the World War II internment of 
Japanese-Americans" (322). Instead of representing a special instance of extralegal action, the 
exception generates its own common law. Thus future presidents who found themselves in 
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situations they believed to be similar to the one President Lincoln faced used his experience as a 
model to justify their breaking of the law. 
This would be similar in a case where the Constitution is bent in order to allow torture of 
certain individuals in times of national emergency. The sanction of torture would start as an 
exception, but with time, future actors would try to repeat that exception to the point that it 
would risk being normalized. That is the reason the executive should not be allowed to bend the 
constitution and allow torture under the justification that it was necessary in that specific 
situation. 
Digging deeper into the example of President Lincoln, Margulies (2006) agrees that 
President Lincoln was right in ignoring the ruling of Chief Justice Taney that suspending Habeas 
Corpus was unconstitutional. However, Margulies emphasizes the fact that we could only know 
that President Lincoln was right a long time after the facts. We had to wait and observe the 
policies he put in place in order to see that their effects were positives. Therefore Margulies 
argues that courts should not allow the bending of the constitution in advance before they see the 
results produced by the bending. In that sense, it is a good thing that Chief Justice Taney ruled 
President Lincoln's order unconstitutional because the results could have been different. 
In the case of the sanction of torture by the executive when we face a ticking bomb scenario, 
Margulies would therefore argue that we can't allow torture without knowing the specific results 
that will result from torturing the ticking bomb scenario. Thus, he is in complete disagreement 
with Posner. 
My own response to Posner's (2006) proposal that we give total and super powers to the 
government in times of emergency is that such a situation appears very dangerous. Ifwe are 
ready to give up some or many of our rights during emergency and accept that the government 
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violates our liberties during times of crisis, I believe we should be ready to do the same forever. 
It is often very difficult to know what constitutes a time of emergency, and similarly, it is often 
very difficult to go back to normal once a state of emergency has been declared. As soon as he 
took power, Hitler declared a state of emergency that lasted more than five years (Friedlander 
1997). The results of Hitler's state of emergency and the powers he attributed to himself during 
those years cannot be discussed here, but it is important to keep Germany in mind while 
considering giving endless super powers to our government during times of crisis. Posner's 
proposal that the constitution be bent during times of emergency would open the door to all sorts 
of ridiculous interpretations, and depending on who happens to be in the government, the 
constitution would change meanings and support selfish agendas. Therefore, it is important that 
the constitution remains solid in times of peace as in times of crisis. If torture is prohibited by the 
constitution, it should remain that way at all times, and anybody who violates that provision of 
the constitution, including the president, should be held accountable. 
Concluding thoughts 
Why this matters 
The torture debate in the United States is relevant to several audiences. This debate 
should be important to all American citizens because what the American government does 
shapes the perception of the United States and of all Americans around the world. If the United 
States allows torture, for example, it would be hard for the United States to point at the Libyan or 
the Iranian government and accuse them of allowing torture in their countries. At least, the 
credibility of the United States would be undermined because the Libyan or Iranian g~vernment 
could invite the United States to consider the cases of torture in the United States. When an 
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American travels abroad, he is identified by what his government does, so it is important that all 
Americans get involved in this debate and do their parts. 
In addition, all global students of politics around the world should be interested in this 
debate because torture is prohibited by the Geneva Convention, to which virtually all nations in 
the world are signatory. If the United States' government sanctions torture while being signatory 
to the Geneva Convention, it is important that citizens in other countries ask themselves whether 
the same thing is happening in their countries. If a country formally agrees to respect the Geneva 
Convention but disregards its rules in actuality, the citizens of that country should confront the 
hypocrisy of their government and join the global torture debate-torture is an issue that affects 
all global citizens. 
Also, this debate is relevant to all university students around the world. The debate has 
been around in political circles for some time, but it seems no final solution has been found. 
Thus it is important that students join the debate. Universities are often the avenues where 
important ideas circulate before they become available to the public, so all students should 
participate in this debate. Moreover, given that the students of the present will be the decision 
makers of the future, it is important that they be prepared to make the right decisions for their 
countries when the time comes. The way to work in that direction is by learning everything that 
is being said about torture and become involved in the debate. And in addition to schools, most 
public institutions should seek to learn more about this topic because, as Crawford (2010) argues, 
"Unless the moral, legal and political consequences of an acceptance of torture by the American 
people[ or citizens of any other country] are taken up in classrooms, congregations, the media and 
other public arenas around the country, the ideology of 'national security' will continue to define 
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the 'debate' over torture, dictate the silences, and shape the public's response to the insecurities 
of our time" (n.p). 
Torture and Violence 
While considering the different positions on the torture debate, it is easy to divorce 
torture from our everyday lives and treat it as something that we, modem human beings, don't do 
naturally. But if the atrocity of torture is ingrained in its cruelty and violence, one has to wonder 
why we are not as appalled by other acts of violence that have been normalized by our society. 
Paul Kahn (2008), in his book Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty, explores that 
question quite skillfully. He argues that most Westerners will believe an individual who is 
punished under the Sharia is being tortured, and they would be offended by such punishment. 
However, those same Westerners would not think it is torture when we place criminal offenders 
in prison cells for decades. Similarly, when Europeans accuse Americans of torturing the people 
we condemn to several years on death row, we are offended. I believe such behaviors show that 
we have a clear idea of what defines the torture that we denounce, but there are aspects of our 
daily lives that we have become immune to, even though others might see those aspects of our 
lives as torture. 
I argue that combat is an even better aspect of our lives that is comparable to torture. 
While the duels that used to define combat in the old times were fair as they opposed two 
individuals with the same weapon, the modem form of combat is anything but fair. As Khan 
(2008) argues, "the logic of combat seeks as its ideal a total asymmetry in the application of 
force. Its end is to obtain a position from which no harm can result to one's own side while all 
the injury is suffered by the enemy" (46). I believe that logic is perfectly applicable to torture. 
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The torturer shows his dominance and extremely abuses the tortured while he, the torturer, 
makes sure not to suffer at all. One could argue that at least in combat one can surrender and stop 
the conflict. But once again, I believe the idea of the conflict that stops because a white 
handkerchief is waved in the air belongs to our forefathers' time. In today's warfare, conflicts 
don't stop just because one side decides to surrender. In the 1999 movie Three Kings, realized by 
David O ..Russel, we follow four American soldiers in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War as 
they decide to steal gold that was stolen from Kuwait. In the opening scene, Sergeant Barlow is 
pointing his gun at an Iraqi soldier who is waiving his white handkerchief. Barlow appears 
confused as to what to do, but he eventually shoots and kills the Iraqi soldier. As he runs towards 
the body of the dead man, fellow American soldiers follow him and take pictures of themselves 
with the body. While that account is the product of fiction, it is important to notice that in the 
real first Gulf War, the Iraqi army was massacred as they fled Kuwait city (Khan, 2008, p.46­
47). This is very similar to a tortured victim that begs for mercy while the torturer ignores and 
continues the torture. 
I con~lude by arguing that torture is an absolutely atrocious practice that should be 
eradicated from the surface of the earth if that is possible. However, I don't see any indication 
that such eradication is plausible in the near future, so we should realize that torture is present in 
our society because of our tendency to use violence as human beings. If we are ready to allow 
war, in essence the mass killing of other human beings in our name, for any reason at all, 
including self-defense, then we must be ready to do the same with torture. 
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